Intellectual property, clearly, is a major component for competitive advantage in the 21st century. We can see many industries where IPR played important roles for competitive advantage in the past. However, the Japanese electronics industry lost its leadership in the DRAM and DVD business, despite the fact that it had strong technology superiority in terms of IPR. This suggests that recognition of IPR importance is not sufficient. This paper deals with patents which are important components of intellectual property; specifically this paper tries to visualize the competitive advantage of technology utilizing the two-dimensional framework of IPR exclusiveness and product life cycle.
Intellectual property, clearly, is major component for competitive advantage in the 21st. century. We can see many industries where intellectual property right (lPR) , played important roles for competitive advantage in the past. However, the Japanese electronics industry lost its leadership in the DRAM and DVD business, despite the fact that it had strong technology superiority in terms of IPR [Yunogami 2007 ], [Sakakibara et al. 2006] . This suggests that recognition of IPR importance is not sufficient. We need to clarify the issues of IPR which were not able to protect industry. This paper tries to define a framework which evaluates the effectiveness of the company's intellectual property program strategy (IP Strategy), to protect and leverage its IP, for business development based on the analysis of past cases. quite different story. The realty is more complex and sophisticated. Figure 1 shows market share of DRAM from 1975 to 2000. The DRAM device was invented by a well known semiconductor venture company in USA in 1970 [Jackson 1998 ] [Intel Corporation 2008] , and the company owned nearly 100-percent market share in the beginning. A few US companies joined the DRAM business later, but the market share of US companies did not change. US companies licensed DRAM patents to Japanese semiconductor companies in this period. As is well known, the cost of semiconductor devices is strongly affected by yield, which is defined by the ratio of the number of good chips to the total number of chips in a silicon wafer. In order to improve yield, process innovation is crucial, and Japanese semiconductor companies did a very good job in this area. As a result, they came up with very high yield, and they also improved DRAM performance in terms of speed, power dissipation, and reliability, which provided a competitive advantage for Japanese semiconductor companies.
Eventually, market share shifted to Japanese enterprises from American companies. The fundamental patents were owned by the American company, but many other related essential patents with respect to, such as, device structure and electronic circuitry were owned by Japanese companies. This meant that American companies, including the original DRAM company, did not have a competitive advantage in terms of intellectual property rights at that time, even if the fundamental patents were owned by the American company. Japanese semiconductor companies enjoyed the DRAM business until the late 1980s.
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Figure 1: DRAM market share for three countries [Yunogami 2007] During these ten years, Japanese semiconductor companies, not only invented a variety of core technologies both in process and design, but also accumulated tacit knowledge for efficient production. There were many joint cooperative efforts between Japanese semiconductor companies and equipment manufacturers. The tacit knowledge, such as fabrication know-how, was embedded into manufacturing equipment through the cooperation. Japanese companies held dominant market share in mid 1980s and also developed such excellent equipments. Japanese companies started licensing IPR to Korean companies. Korean semiconductor companies used equipment with embedded fabrication know-how and, with continued development efforts, eventually obtained substantial market share. In this stage, Korean semiconductor companies established a strong competitiveness in technology. Recently, Korean companies have filed important patents as well.
On the other hand, the microprocessor business initiated by the same American company showed a completely different story, as shown in Figure 2 . The microprocessor was originally invented by the American venture company in the process of custom chip development for a Japanese calculator manufacturer in 1971. The venture company bought ownership rights back so that the IPR could be used for other customers. In the beginning, the American company licensed the IPR of microprocessor, including second-source licensing to around ten semiconductor companies, because customers used to request second sourcing to secure parts supply. But when the market began to grow, the company changed its licensing strategy. The company limited second-source licensing strictly to three companies in 1982. Since 1985, it completely closed second-source licensing for new microprocessor products. This period was far before the PC market matured, and it is considered to be the best timing for a licensing strategy. The company took many proactive efforts to protect its own IPR. This includes litigations on patents, microcode, and registered trademarks. The company also contributed to the revision of software copyright case law to cover microprocessor microcode, and it initiated protection of mask work design. With tremendous effort to develop cutting-edge technology and these proactive efforts to protect IPR, the company has built a strong exclusive technological position [Intel Corporation 2008] , [Jackson 1998 ], [Hirata 1998 ], [Takahashi 2001 The microprocessor market share trend shown in Figure 2 is completely different from the DRAM market share trend, which means that similar IPR superiority does not result in similar business success. We need to develop a framework by which we can evaluate the effective competitive advantage of technology and business success. This will provide a tool to create strategy and to forecast the future market position. Differentiation with IPR means developing a situation in which a company can exclusively utilize its specific IPR. Hence, we have focused on the exclusiveness of IPR in defining the framework. Two important concepts are the actual meaning of patent licensing and the timing for leveraging the IPR in the product life cycle.
3.1

Meaning of patent licensing
The completely different outcomes for DRAM and microprocessors are considered to be a result of the licensing scheme. Providing competitors the right to use a patent is to sell the technology in exchange for a licensing fee. It has a big impact on market competition, while it increases the competitor's cost only a little.
A few years after DRAM invention, the American corporation held the fundamental DRAM patents and had a monopoly on the DRAM market. Japanese companies licensed these patents from US companies and entered the DRAM business. They made tremendous efforts in R&D and provided DRAM of better quality, cost, and performance. During this phase, Japanese companies obtained many essential patents, as did American companies. The Japanese companies were competitive, if they were able to improve their cost structure to cover the licensing fee. The original American DRAM company decided to withdraw from the DRAM business in 1985, because Japanese companies reduced its cost far below the level.
Korean companies, having neither fundamental patents nor essential patents, licensed these DRAM patents from Japanese and American companies in early 1980s [Boku 2008 ]. The Korean companies, eventually, drove Japanese companies out of the DRAM market.
This indicates that IPR itself is not sufficient to have competitive advantage in the society of knowledge economy. It also indicates that any company has to have a clear IP Strategy in order to build business superiority by utilizing IPR as a weapon to cope with competition. "Having technology superiority" and "building a competitive business advantage" are two totally different things.
3.2
Patent management strategy in early stages of the product life cycle
The case of DRAM indicates that timing for leveraging IPR is strategically important. Many products, including DRAM, are implemented utilizing a variety of technology. Therefore a lot of new technologies are created over time. The original DRAM company who owned the fundamental DRAM patents naturally filed other essential patents, while latecomers also contributed to new essential patents, as long as they made long term R&D efforts in the same product segment. Figure 3 shows the contribution of US, Japanese, and Korean companies to DRAM patents as a function of time. 
Figure 3: Contribution to DRAM patents
In the 1980s, Japanese companies contributed to new technologies and filed many essential patents in DRAM technology. Korean companies did so in important supplemental patents in the 1990s and after. The balance of power in IPR changed quite a lot in the 1990s. In this stage, even the past leading companies could not stay in the game without utilizing important supplemental patents invented by latecomers. In other words, the latecomers possessed deterrent power against attack from past leading companies based upon IPR. So, it is crucial to take strategic IPR action before latecomers establish a strong IPR position.
3.3
Defining proprietary technology level
First of all, a new concept of "proprietary technology level" was defined. This index shows a level of effective exclusiveness of specific technology in the competing environment.
1. Level l, "Lowest position": The company does not own essential patents for the products. There is a risk to be removed from the market by competitors. If a company does not take any action to remove competitors by its own IPR, then the company is considered to be in level 1. This is because technology superiority in terms of business competition means building a situation in which competitors cannot use the company's proprietary technology, which is essential for the specific products. Not allowing them to possess deterrent power is also important.
2. Level 2, "Pool Licensing": A company owns essential patents and licenses them through a patent pool [Nagaoka S, et al 2005] . In this case, the company is promoting industry standards. The company does not have a sufficient competitive advantage with respect to the patents, because the company is required to license equally to all competitors with a relatively low licensing fee. Pool licensing to latecomers and catch-up companies will lead to a situation similar to the DRAM case.
3. Level 3, "Individual licensing": A company owns essential patents and licenses them to specific companies individually. This level can be divided into two parts, depending on the number of licensees. The first one is to license to many players in the same industry. Unless the company has extremely strong patents, the company has to provide IPR to the competitors with very limited or no conditions. In this case, the company cannot maintain a competitive advantage in technology. Therefore, a company, that is in from level l to this level, stays in the price war. The second one is to license IPR to a few competitors in exchange for necessary patents owned by the competitors. The company has the ability to control the IPR in this second case.
4. Level 4, "Oligopoly": Few companies own almost all essential patents. The companies are also licensees, through cross-licensing, of other necessary patents owned by competitors or possess deterrent power against IPR attack from competitors.
5. Level 5, "Monopoly": One company owns virtually all the essential patents. At the same time, the company has licensed any other necessary patents.
3.4
Proposed fr amework for IPR evaluation
The proprietary technology level shows a status at a certain time, so it must be expanded by adding a time axis in order to analyze the competitive advantage of a technology from a business perspective. An appropriate selection for the time axis is the product life cycle (PLC), and this is shown in Figure 4 . In the product introduction phase ("Introduction"), there are generally many players, and proprietary technology levels are unclear. The early growth phase ("Early half'), however, is the most important timing for creating a competitive advantage with technology, since there is no giant player at this moment. A company that utilizes technology strength and that concentrate efforts to defeat competitors in terms of technology during this period will be a winner in the future market. The market grows in the late growth phase ("Late half'), and several companies establish their market position at the time. Unless a company otherwise owns extremely strong IPR, it is hard to change the technology position in the market. The same is true in the matured phase ("Matured"). The figure also shows three positions for establishing competitive advantage through technology: "Key for creating competitiveness," "Competitive," and "Relatively competitive." Here, the key for success is to reach level 4 and 5 in the early growing stage, in order to establish a strong competitive position in the market. American microprocessor company has established virtually monopolistic posItIOn with its outstanding IP Strategy. On the other hand, the Japanese DRAM companies, in spite of the fact that they had strong IPR, were forced to fight in the so called red ocean. The Japanese DRAM companies were in the top position when they could keep cost leadership, but they lost their position when other players with better cost leadership came in. Figure 4 clearly illustrates the difference between the two cases. The framework can be a useful tool for creating a company's IP Strategy.
4 Application to the case of the DVD pro d ucts business
A new framework for IPR evaluation was proposed based on the analysis of market share of DRAM and microprocessors in conjunction with IP Strategy. To verify whether the tool can be applied to another case, we have investigated the DVD product business started in 1996. As is well known, almost all fundamental technologies were invented by Japanese companies. The Japanese companies stood in a very strong IPR position, and they obtained nearly 100% market share in the beginning. However, when they licensed DVD-related patents through the patent pool for promotion as industry standards, they lost their competitive advantage, and they also lost the market share, as shown in Figure 5 . This is also the case that Japanese companies, regardless of their excellent IPR, stayed in the price war and eventually handed their market over to China, Indonesia and Malaysia. This can be explained by the new framework, and it implies the usefulness of the model. We have investigated a case of DRAM and Microprocessor business in terms of market share from the viewpoint of intellectual property rights management. It was clarified that IPR itself is not sufficient to establish competitive advantage in the knowledge economy. It was also made clear that any company has to have a clear IP Strategy in order to build business superiority by utilizing IPR as a weapon to cope with competition. "Having technology superiority" and "Building a competitive business advantage" are two totally different things. We have proposed a new concept of technology proprietary levels. A new framework with the proprietary levels and product life cycle was proposed for evaluating a company's IP Strategy.
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